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According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, when you have an experience with content p, 
you often have prima facie justification for believing p that doesn’t rest on your 
independent justification for believing any proposition. Although dogmatism has an 
intuitive appeal and seems to have an antisceptical bite, it has been targeted by 
various objections. This paper principally aims to answer the objections by Roger 
White according to which dogmatism is inconsistent with the Bayesian account of 
how evidence affects our rational credences. If this were true, the rational 
acceptability of dogmatism would be seriously questionable. I respond that these 
objections don’t get off the ground because they assume that our experiences and 
our introspective beliefs that we have experiences have the same evidential force, 
whereas the dogmatist is uncommitted to this assumption. I also consider the 
question whether dogmatism has an antisceptical bite. I suggest that the answer 
turns on whether or not the Bayesian can determine the priors of hypotheses and 
conjectures on the grounds of their extra-empirical virtues. If the Bayesian can do 
so, the thesis that dogmatism has an antisceptical bite is probably false. 
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Pryor (2000) has introduced an interesting epistemological position called dogmatism according to 
which, roughly:  
 
When it perceptually seems to you as if p is the case, you have [prima facie] justification for 
believing p that does not presuppose or rest on your justification for anything else... To have 
this justification for believing p, you need only have an experience that represents p as being 
the case. No further awareness or reflection or background beliefs are required. (519)1 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Similar positions have been proposed by, among others, Pollock (1986) and Huemer (2001). 
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For instance, if you experience as if this is a hand, you acquire prima facie justification for 
believing that this is a hand even if you have no independent justification for believing that no 
sceptical scenario is instantiated or that your perception is reliable.2 
 Although Pryor’s position might strike one as natural and intuitive, it has laid itself open to 
criticism of a different kind. This paper principally aims to answer the Bayesian objections by 
White (2006). These objections purport to show that dogmatism is inconsistent with the Bayesian 
account of how evidence rationally affects our credences. If this were true, the rational acceptability 
of dogmatism would be at risk. I respond that White’s objections don’t get off the ground because 
they assume that our experiences and our introspective beliefs that we have experiences have the 
same evidential force, whereas the dogmatist is uncommitted to this assumption. I also consider the 
question whether dogmatism has an antisceptical bite, as Pryor contends. I suggest that the answer 
turns on whether or not the Bayesian can determine her prior credences by appealing to extra-
empirical evidence, which is controversial. If the Bayesian can do so, the thesis that dogmatism has 
an antisceptical punch is probably false.   
 This is the paper’s structure: §2 introduces dogmatism. §3 illustrates apparent merits of 
dogmatism. §4 reviews White’s objections. §5 explains why dogmatism is not inconsistent with 
Bayesianism. §6 suggests that if the Bayesian can use extra-empirical evidence to determine her 
prior credences, dogmatism has probably no antisceptical bite. §7 draws the conclusions. 
 
2. Dogmatism 
The dogmatist endorses the popular view in contemporary philosophy of mind that apparent 
perceptions or experiences are not just occurrences of sense data but mental states provided with 
propositional contents.3 These contents are about, not the subjective character of our experiences, 
but observable things in the world. Since these contents represent the world accurately or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 My paper attempts to adhere to the original picture of dogmatism presented in Pryor (2000 and 2004), which I find 
plausible. 
3 Many philosophers nowadays maintain that experiences have representational contents, but not just everyone 
identifies these contents with propositional contents. See Siegel (2011) for an overview. 
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inaccurately, experiences have conditions of accuracy. According to the dogmatist, believing p and 
experiencing as if p are two independent ways to entertain the same content p; hence experiences 
are not beliefs, though both of them have contents.4 Other mental states have contents – e.g. hopes 
and desires. These states also represent the world in virtue of their contents, but hopes and desires 
aren’t experiences because their content is hoped or desired rather than experienced. Experiences 
and beliefs have it in common that they both represent assertively: when they represent that p, they 
do so in a way that purports to show how the world actually is (cf. Pryor 2005: 187-188). This 
doesn’t happen with hopes and desires.  
 Pryor (2000) characterises dogmatism as follows:  
[For any content of experience p,] whenever you have an experience of p’s being the case, 
you thereby have immediate (prima facie) justification for believing p. (532) 
 
Pryor (2000: 533-534 and 2005: 183) implicitly recognises that this characterisation is inaccurate. It 
looks implausible that whenever a subject S experiences as if p, S has justification for believing p. 
S’s having justification for believing p requires for instance S to be able to entertain the belief that p. 
But S might be unable to do this in certain cases. Thus, in order to enable S to have justification for 
p, further conditions additional to S’s mere experiencing as if p ought to be fulfilled. Pryor would 
seem to assume that these additional conditions are often satisfied in everyday life. Therefore, a 
more accurate characterization of dogmatism is the following:  
(DG) For any content of experience p, your experience as if p can (and will often) give you 
immediate prima facie justification for believing p. 
 
Let us dissect DG. The dogmatist endorses an internalist notion of epistemic justification5 (cf. 
Pryor 2000: 542, note 9) and focuses on propositional justification6 (cf. Pryor 2000: 521). To 
characterise the notion of immediate justification let us first clarify the notion of mediate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 One can experience as if p without believing p – for example when one knows one is having an optical illusion.	  
5 According to the internalist, if p is justified for a subject, all factors that make p justified for her are recognisable by 
the subject by mere reflection or are identifiable with some of the subject’s mental states. Dogmatism satisfies the first 
condition at least.  6	  A subject has propositional justification for believing p if, whether or not she believes p or believe p for the right 
reason, it would be epistemically appropriate for her to believe p.	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justification.7 One has mediate justification for believing a proposition p if and only if one has 
justification for believing p and at least part of this justification it is based on independent 
justification of whatever (non-zero) degree one has for some proposition. Saying that one’s 
justification for p is based on one’s independent justification for some proposition is saying, for 
Pryor, that the first justification is constituted by or exists in virtue of the second justification. 
Suppose you look at the battery status indicator of your laptop, which reads ‘0%’. You have 
justification for believing that (P) the indicator reads ‘0%’. Your justification for P, together with 
your justification for other propositions (e.g. propositions about the function of the indicator and the 
components of your computer), gives you justification for believing that (Q) your laptop’s battery is 
flat. In this case it seems correct to say that your justification for Q exists in virtue of, among other 
things, your independent justification for P. Thus your justification for Q is mediate. 
 One has immediate justification for believing a proposition p if and only if one has justification 
for believing p and no part of this justification is based on one’s independent justification of 
whatever (non-zero) degree for any proposition. Suppose you have justification for believing that 
(P) you are in pain, and that you have it because you feel pain. In this case your justification for 
believing P exists in virtue of, among other things, your feeling. But no part of this justification 
seems to exist in virtue of independent justification you have for believing any proposition. Thus 
your pain gives you immediate justification for P (cf. Pryor 2005: 182-183). 
 Pain has presumably no representational content. The dogmatist contends that mental states with 
content can also supply immediate justification. For instance: 
An experience as if there being hands seems to justify one in believing there are hands in a 
perfectly straightforward and immediate way. (Pryor 2000: 536) 
 
For the dogmatist this example generalises: any experience with content p is able to provide prima 
facie immediate justification for believing p. The dogmatist denies that experiences can justify their 
contents because experiences are in turn justified. An introspective belief about an experience (i.e. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Pryor (2005) and Siegel and Silins (forthcoming) for more detailed presentations of these two notions.  
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one’s belief that one has a given experience) can be justified, but it seems to make no sense to say 
that an experience can in itself be epistemically justified (cf. Pryor 2005: 189). Pryor maintains that 
experiences can justify their contents because of their distinctive phenomenology that makes them 
represent their contents assertively. He describes this phenomenology as ‘the feeling of seeming to 
ascertain that a given proposition is true’ (Pryor 2004: 357. Cf. also Pryor 2000: 547, note 37). 
According to the dogmatist, the phenomenology of seeming to ascertain that p is true can provide 
the subject with a defeasible reason – and thus a defeasible justification – for taking p as true. 
 The dogmatist doesn’t claim that any proposition justified by experience is immediately justified 
by it. In the example about the laptop, the justification for believing that (Q) my laptop’s battery is 
flat comes in part from my experiencing something. But in that case my experiencing cannot have 
Q as its content. As it is very implausible that I can literally experience as if my laptop’s battery is 
flat. Accordingly, the dogmatist wouldn’t say that Q can be immediately justified by my experience. 
The propositions that I can literally experience to be true are – for the dogmatist – the contents of 
my experiences.	  Pryor leaves it largely indeterminate what propositions qualify as contents of one’s 
experience,8 though he includes among them those about elementary and familiar material objects, 
such as the proposition that there is a red cube or that there is a hand. According to DG, we can 
have immediate prima facie justification for believing the contents of our experiences, whichever 
propositions they turn out to be (cf. Pryor 2000: 538-539 and 2004: 357). 
 Immediate perceptual justification comes as prima facie justification because it can be defeated 
by additional evidence possessed by the subject (cf. Pryor 2000: 545, note 28). Whether immediate 
perceptual justification is also all things considered justification depends on what other evidence 
the subject possesses and on whether or not this evidence acts as a defeater. Different sorts of things 
count as defeaters. Perceptual justification for believing p can be defeated – for instance – by 
evidence in favour of ~p (where ‘~’ is logical negation), by evidence that p’s truth is, in the relevant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For a survey of the different options see Siegel (2011). 
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circumstances, not ascertainable by perception, by evidence that one’s senses are malfunctioning, 
and so on (cf. Pryor 2000: 534). 
 
3. Apparent merits of dogmatism 
Dogmatism looks attractive and plausible for various motives. To begin with, DG seems to match 
everyday epistemic practices. In ordinary circumstances we might have more or less explicit beliefs 
about, say, the reliability of our faculties, but our reasons for holding many of our ordinary 
perceptual beliefs don’t seem to include the reasons we have for these additional beliefs. Instead we 
seem to entertain many of our perceptual beliefs just because of how things appear to us to be. 
Imagine for instance you have the experience as if an apple is on the table. In that case you would 
normally answer the question ‘Why do you have any reason for believing that there is an apple on 
the table?’ by simply saying ‘Because I see it’. The answer ‘Because I see it and I have reasons to 
believe that my faculties are reliable’ would appear quite unnatural. 
 Dogmatism also forms the basis for modest foundationalism (that makes no claim of infallibility, 
certainty, or self-evidence for the foundations). For it sheds light on how propositions can be prima 
facie justified directly by experience without inference from other independently justified 
propositions (cf. Pryor 2005: 184-192). Finally, dogmatism would seem to offer a response to 
perceptual scepticism. Since I will attempt an appraisal of the antisceptical consequences of Pryor’s 
position in §6, let me now describe this response in some detail.    
 The sceptic typically appeals to non-perceiving alternatives. Suppose you have perceptual 
justification for believing p. An essential characteristic of any non-perceiving alternative sh to p is 
that your perceptual justification for p would be defeated if you had reason to believe that sh is true 
(cf. Pryor 2000: 527). There are at least two types of non-perceiving alternatives: those 
incompatible and those compatible with p. Suppose P says that there is an apple before you, SH1 
says that you are a disembodied soul in an immaterial world having the hallucination of an apple 
before you produced by a demon, and that SH2 says that a computer linked to your brain makes you 
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experience as if there is an apple before you. If you had reason to believe that SH1 or SH2 is true, 
you would distrust your experience as if P as a ground for believing P. Note that while SH1 rules 
out P, SH2 doesn’t. So SH1 is incompatible with P whereas SH2 compatible with it. 
 A popular argument for perceptual scepticism runs as follows (cf. Pryor 2000: 524-532 and 
Schiffer 2004: 161-165):  
(1)  For any proposition p, you can acquire justification for believing p from your experience 
only if you have independent justification for believing that no non-perceiving alternative 
sh to p is true (i.e. for believing ~sh for any relevant sh). 
(2) You cannot possess such independent justification. 
Therefore: 
(3) You cannot acquire justification for believing any p from your experience. 
 
 This argument is logically valid but its premises can be questioned. The dogmatist uses DG to 
reject or discredit (1). The dogmatist argues that if DG is true, (1) is false or very implausible when 
p stands for a content of experience (in Pryor’s sense). Note that DG and (1) look at first blush 
compatible. In brief DG entails that you can acquire justification for believing p form your 
experiencing as if p even if your justification for p is not based on any independent justification for 
believing any proposition. We saw before that in order for you to possess this immediate 
justification for p, some necessary conditions additional to your experiencing as if p should be 
fulfilled. These conditions may require you to have independent justification for some proposition – 
this is not forbidden by DG if this justification is no basis for your justification for p (I’ll give some 
example in §5). In apparent agreement with this, (1) doesn’t say that the independent justification 
for ~sh necessary for your perceptual justification for p is a basis of that perceptual justification.  
 Pryor (2000: 545, note 33) contends that, in spite of this apparent harmony, DG undercuts the 
most natural line of reasoning that the sceptic can use to support (1). This line of reasoning says that 
you need independent justification for ~sh just because your perceptual justification for p needs to 
be based on your independent justification for ~sh. But if DG is true, this reasoning is fallacious 
because you can have perceptual justification for p that is not based on your independent 
justification for ~sh. If DG is true, it is open to the sceptic to try to defend (1) by other means. The 
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sceptic should explain why your having independent justification for ~sh is necessary but not 
basing for your having perceptual justification for p. But it is difficult to imagine how the sceptic 
could motivate this claim. 
 Suppose the dogmatist has succeeded in rejecting (1) by adducing DG. The dogmatist could then 
press the sceptic once again by arguing that even if we don’t possess default justification for 
disbelieving any non-perceiving alternative, we can have perceptual justification for disbelieving 
some of them. Consider any non-perceiving alternative sh incompatible with p. You know that p 
entails ~sh, and justification is presumably closed under known entailment. Therefore, if you 
acquire immediate prima facie justification for believing p from your experience as if p, that 
justification must flow to ~sh through the entailment. Hence you will acquire prima facie 
justification for disbelieving sh too (cf. Pryor 2004: 361-362). 
 
4. White’s objections 
Dogmatism has caught the attention of philosophers but also prompted their criticism.9 Siegel and 
Silins (forthcoming) have suggested lines of reply to many of these objections. My article 
specifically focuses on the objections raised in White (2006) aiming to show that dogmatism is 
inconsistent with the Bayesian account of how evidence rationally affects our credences. The 
Bayesian assumes that degrees of rational belief – or credences – obey the probability calculus and 
conceives of both hypotheses and evidence as propositions believed with a given degree of strength. 
Thanks to its intuitive appeal, ductility and a list of penetrating analyses, Bayesianism is 
tremendously influential in today’s epistemology. If dogmatism were proven to be incompatible 
with Bayesianism, many would conclude that dogmatism has to go to the wall. In any case this 
clash would generate a philosophical puzzle with no easy solution. 
White formulates his objections synchronically. However, as these objections appear to be about 
epistemic processes, to make my analysis as accurate as possible I prefer to re-formulate them 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See for instance Schiffer (2004), White (2006), Wright (2007) and Siegel and Silins (forthcoming). 
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diachronically. Let Cr be a rational subject S’s credence function, and let Cre be S’s credence 
function updated upon S’s learning that e is true. I take the updating procedure to be standard 
conditionalisation, according to which Cre(p) = Cr(p|e) and Cre(e) = 1. This says that for any 
propositions p and e on which Cr is defined, as S learns e, S’s credence in p equates to the 
conditional credence in p given e that S had before learning e, and S’s credence in e becomes the 
highest possible. White assumes that the degree of epistemic justification for believing a proposition 
p that one has in a given situation and the degree of credence in p that one should rationally have in 
the same situation coincide or are very closely related to one another. This assumption is very 
intuitive, so I won’t question it. From this assumption White infers that, in general, one acquires 
some justification for believing a proposition p from evidence e if and only if one’s credence in p 
should increase upon one’s learning e.10 
Suppose now that:  
E = ‘It appears to me that this is a hand’. 
P = ‘This is a hand’. 
SH = ‘This is a fake-hand’. 
A fake-hand is everything that is not a hand but cannot be visually distinguished from a hand. 
‘Examples of fake-hands include perfect plastic replicas of hands, and moving projected holograms 
of hands’ (White 2006: 528). Thus SH stands for any hypothesis incompatible with P that entails E 
or makes E highly probable.  
This is White’s first objection. It is very plausible that CrP(E) ≅ CrSH(E) ≅ 1 – i.e. my credence in 
E should be close to certainty when the truth of P or the truth of SH is given to me. Furthermore, 
since I shouldn’t in general expect to have the experience of a hand, Cr(E) << 1 – i.e. my prior 
credence in E should be far from certainty. Thus CrP(E) > Cr(E) and CrSH(E) > Cr(E). It is easy to 
prove that the first inequality entails that CrE(P) > Cr(P), and the second that CrE(SH) > Cr(SH). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The only if direction of this biconditional is controversial (cf. Wright 2011 and Moretti and Piazza 2013). I don’t want 
to press this objection here because it would distract us from more serious difficulties of White’s arguments. 
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This indicates that when I learn E, I acquire some justification for both P and SH. It can be shown 
that CrE(SH) > Cr(SH) entails that CrE(~SH) < Cr(~SH). This indicates that when I learn E, my 
justification for ~SH decreases. Thus it seems that when I experience as if this is a hand, I cannot 
acquire justification for ~SH. White concludes from this – in contradiction with Pryor’s contention 
– that if I have perceptual justification for P, this justification cannot transmit from P to P’s logical 
consequence ~SH (cf. White 2006: 532-533). 
 This is White’s second objection. (Although White’s second objection follows from his first, the 
second objection is actually his central objection because it directly targets DG.) It can be proven 
that since ~SH logically follows from P, CrE(P) ≤ CrE(~SH). We saw before that CrE(~SH) < Cr(~SH). These two formulae trivially entail that CrE(P) < Cr(~SH). This means that ‘its 
appearing to me that this is a hand can render me justifiably confident that it is a hand, only if I am 
already confident that it is not a fake-hand’ (White 2006: 534). White assumes here that when Pryor 
speaks of justification for a proposition p, he speaks of justification for being confident that p, 
which is – it seems to me – roughly the same as justification for fully believing p. This reading of 
Pryor’s views actually matches many of his claims.11 Hence I will not question this interpretation. 
We can model justification for full belief as sufficiently high rational credence: one has justification 
for fully believing p just in case one’s credence in p should rationally exceed a given value t, 
presumably very high and close to 1. CrE(P) < Cr(~SH) entails that CrE(P) > t only if Cr(~SH) > t. 
Thus it seems that unless I already have justification for fully believing ~SH, when I experience as 
if P I cannot acquire justification for fully believing P. White appears to take this upshot to show 
that, when epistemic justification is analysed in Bayesian terms, my experience as if P cannot give 
me immediate justification for believing P. This clashes with DG.12 
 To highlight the intuitive plausibility of the conclusions of his arguments, White outlines two 
thought experiments involving again P, E and ~SH (cf. White 2006: 535-537). In these thought 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 At least in Pryor (2000) and (2005). 
12 Schiffer (2004) puts forward a criticism of dogmatism that (insofar as I understand it) is similar to this objection. 
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experiments it would be hardly questionable – according to White – that my experiencing as if P 
lessens my justification for ~SH. For it would be hardly questionable that CrE(~SH) < Cr(~SH). As 
we have seen, this inequality constitutes a crucial step in the articulation of White’s both objections.  
 For the sake of completeness let me briefly describe the first of these thought experiments. 
Suppose I’m put to sleep while you write on three cards the following instructions:13 
Card-A: Chop off my hands and replace them with fake ones. 
Card-B: Leave my hands alone. 
Card-C: Chop off my hands and leave the stumps. 
You put the three cards in a hat. You randomly pick one card and stolidly carry out the instructions. 
When I’m awake and I lift an arm, (E) it appears to me that this is a hand. Since I know the random 
procedure with the cards you intended to follow, before learning E my degree of credence in ~SH 
should be 2/3. But after learning E, my degree of credence in ~SH should drop to 1/2. For now I 
know that you didn’t pick Card-C, but I also know that you could have picked Card-A just as easily 
as Card-B. So CrE(~SH) < Cr(~SH).14 
 White’s Bayesian objections seem to aim to question dogmatism – prominently DG – and the 
dogmatist’s responses to the perceptual sceptic at once. For the sake of clarity I prefer to divorce 
these two challenges. In the next section I will investigate whether dogmatism and Bayesianism are 
actually inconsistent. In the subsequent section I will investigate whether dogmatism has actually an 
antisceptical bite.  
 
5. Dogmatism and Bayesianism are not inconsistent  
White’s objections have impressed many epistemologists and led some to respond. For instance, 
Pryor (manuscript), Weatherson (2007) and Kung (2010) all suggest ways to revise the Bayesian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In White’s original example you are put to sleep and I write the instructions on the cards. For reasons of stylistic 
coherence with the rest of my paper I have swapped you with me. 14	  White’s second thought experiment is similar but based on statistical claims: e.g. the percentages of living people 
who are missing one hand and have a plastic replica or a stump.	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framework to accommodate the intuitions of the dogmatist.15 In contrast with revisionary responses 
of this type, Silins (2007) argues that White hasn’t actually shown that DG and Bayesianism are 
incompatible. Although I agree on this conclusion, I’m not satisfied with Silins’s argument.16 
Before articulating my own argument – which I believe is more compelling – let me explain the 
reasons of my discontent with Silins’s. 
Recall that the salient formal result of White’s second objection is given by the following 
inequality: CrE(P) < Cr(~SH). White takes – or seems to take – this formula to contradict DG. Silins 
(2007: 131) responds that this inequality doesn’t establish that my having independent justification 
for believing ~SH is a condition necessary and basing for my acquiring perceptual justification for 
P. White’s inequality can at best establish – according to Silins – that my having independent 
justification for believing ~SH is a condition necessary for my acquiring perceptual justification for 
believing P. Since DG doesn’t disallow conditions for perceptual justification that are necessary but 
not basing, White’s inequality doesn’t contradict DG. To bolster his response, Silins gives 
examples of other conditions for perceptual justification that appear necessary but not basing (cf. 
Silins 2007: 131-132). Let us consider two of them. Take the conceptually true proposition that (Q) 
a hand is a hand. I always have justification for believing Q if I possess the concepts required to 
entertain Q. Note that my learning E gives me justification for believing that (P) this is a hand only 
if I have the concepts required to entertain P, which include – presumably – the very concepts 
required to entertain Q. Consequently, whenever my experience gives me justification for believing 
P, I also have independent justification for believing Q. My having independent justification for Q 
is thus a necessary condition for my having perceptual justification for P but it doesn’t look like a 
basing condition for it. For instance, no part of my perceptual justification for P seems to exist in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 All these proposals aim at a formal vindication of the thesis that when I learn E, my degree of justification for ~SH 
increases. To achieve this, Pryor (insofar as I understand him) replaces the standard credence function with an original 
superadditive credence function, Weatherson switches to imprecise probabilities and introduces a non-standard 
conditionalisation procedure, Kung re-interprets the standard notion of incremental confirmation to the effect that a 
proposition e can confirm a proposition p even if Cr(p|e) ≤ Cr(p).  
16 Also note that Silins (2007: §3.2) concedes that White’s first objection goes through. It will shortly be apparent that I 
disagree. 
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virtue of, among other things, my independent justification for believing Q. Consider now the 
contingent proposition that (Q*) I exist. Presumably, whenever I have perceptual justification for 
believing P, I also have a cogito-style independent justification for believing Q*. In this case too my 
having independent justification for Q* is a necessary condition for my having perceptual 
justification for P but it doesn’t appear to be a basing condition for it.  
 Silins’s response to White is ingenious but it seems to me to be fairly questionable. Compare the 
following two propositions: 
(B1) If I have justification for believing P when I learn E, I have it on the basis of, among 
other things, my independent justification for Q (or Q*). 
 
(B2)  If I have some degree of justification for P when I learn E, I have it on the basis of, 
among other things, my higher degree of independent justification for ~SH. 
 
If B2 is true, my having a higher degree of independent justification for ~SH is a condition 
necessary and basing for my having some degree of perceptual justification for P. I agree with 
Silins that B1 is blatantly false. Yet B2 doesn’t look false when examined in light of White’s 
inequality according to which CrE(P) < Cr(~SH). Quite the reverse, once it is granted that degrees of 
justification are intimately related to degrees of rational credence, the claim that  
If I have some degree of justification for P when I learn E, this justification exists in virtue of, 
among other things, my higher degree of independent justification for ~SH  
 
would seem to be the most natural explanation of why CrE(P) < Cr(~SH). (Or, at any rate, many 
epistemologists would claim so.) Thus White’s inequality would seem to give us a reason to accept 
B2 through an inference to the best explanation.17 B2 entails that my having a degree of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 It is worth stressing that Silins (2007) gives no explanation (or no good explanation) of how it can be the case that 
CrE(P) < Cr(~SH) if my having a higher degree of independent justification for ~SH is a condition only necessary but 
not basing for my having some degree of perceptual justification for P. In particular, the interesting philosophical view 
that Silins outlines in his paper – called rationalist liberalism – entails that my having independent justification for 
believing ~SH (note: not higher independent justification for ~SH) is a condition necessary but not basing for my 
having perceptual justification for believing P (cf. Silins 2007: 132-133). (In a nutshell this views says that: (1) E gives 
me immediate justification for believing P; (2) I can have justification for believing P from E only if I have no reason to 
suspect that SH is true; (3) if I have no reason to suspect that SH is true, I’m entitled to believe ~SH – i.e. I have 
independent justification for believing ~SH.) Since rationalist liberalism leaves it indeterminate whether my necessary 
but not basing independent justification for ~SH must be higher or lower than or equal to my perceptual justification for 
P, I don’t see how the truth of this view could constitute an explanation (or at least a good explanation) of White’s 
inequality. One could take the inability of rationalist liberalism to explain this neat inequality to be evidence against it. 
Silins’s rationalist liberalism has been independently criticised by Kotzen (2012). 
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independent justification sufficiently high to sustain full belief in ~SH is a condition necessary and 
basing for my having a degree of perceptual justification sufficiently high to sustain full belief in P. 
This claim would seem to be incompatible with DG because it seems to entail that my experience as 
if P cannot give me immediate justification for believing P. For these reasons I don’t find Silins’s 
response to White convincing. I suspect that many epistemologists will share my concerns. 
Rather than attempting to improve on Silins’s case, let me present a completely different 
argument for the claim that dogmatism and Bayesianism are compatible that appears to me to be 
less moot and more straightforward. White (2006) relies on a formal model in which empirical 
evidence is a believed proposition about an experience – i.e. one’s introspective belief that one has a 
given experience. Thus empirical evidence turns out to be a content believed. In contrast, we saw 
that for the dogmatist empirical evidence is a content experienced rather than believed. The basic 
source of difficulties for both of White’s objections is that they presuppose a notion of perceptual 
evidence that is not the one distinctive of dogmatism. Consequently, these objections are incapable 
of striking the dogmatist’s notion of perceptual justification. Let me now expand on this response. 
We have seen that for the Bayesian Cre(p) refers the degree of credence in p that a subject should 
rationally have when she learns e – i.e. when she comes to believe e to the highest possible degree. 
Accordingly, CrE(P), CrE(SH) and CrE(~SH), in White’s objections, refer to the degrees of credence 
in respectively P, SH and ~SH that I should have when I come to believe E to the highest possible 
degree, where E is proposition that it appears to me that P. To model the dogmatist’s notion of 
perceptual justification one should use a different formalism capable of symbolising the credence in 
P, SH and ~SH that I should have when I experience as if P.18 White’s model is thus 
misrepresentative in two senses: (1) it replaces the content P with the different content E and (2) it 
replaces an experience with a belief. Since the expressions CrE(P), CrE(SH) and CrE(~SH) don’t 
refer to the credence in P, SH and ~SH that I should have when I experience as if P, the conclusions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Note that I’m not denying that there is an intimate link between experience-based justification and rational credence. 
What I’m simply suggesting is that the notion of rational credence intimately related to the notion of experience-based 
justification cannot adequately be modelled by a Bayesian credence function.	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of White’s arguments cannot affect – at least directly – the dogmatist’s theses about perceptual 
justification.19 
One might try to reformulate White’s objections by replacing E with P itself. This would help 
cope with problem (1) but not with problem (2). For CrE(P), CrE(SH) and CrE(~SH) will turn into 
CrP(P), CrP(SH) and CrP(~SH), which refer to the degrees credence in P, SH and ~SH that I should 
have when I come to believe P to the highest possible degree. One might contend that since 
experiencing as if P and coming to believe P have similar evidential consequences for the subject, 
the second can be taken to be a close surrogate for the first. Whether or not this is in general correct, 
coming to believe P to the highest possible degree doesn’t seem to be a close surrogate for 
experiencing as if P. An important difference is that while one’s experiencing as if P is compatible 
with one’s rationally doubting P, one’s coming to rationally believe P to the highest possible degree 
is not. 
A more crucial problem with replacing E with P is that this operation would make the resulting 
re-formulations of White’s objections inconclusive. These re-formulations would go through only if 
it turned out that my learning P should lessen (or at least should not boost) my credence in ~SH. For 
this would parallel the crucial proposition in White’s both objection that my learning E should 
lessen my credence in ~SH. Yet note that since P entails ~SH and Cr(P) > 0, it follows that 
CrP(~SH) = 1. Since I shouldn’t be just certain that ~SH, Cr(~SH) < 1. Hence CrP(~SH) > Cr(~SH). 
Thus the result is that my learning P should boost my credence in ~SH. 
One might suggest replacing E with P while using Jeffrey conditionalisation instead of standard 
conditionalisation. Jeffrey conditionalisation enables a rational subject S to update her credence 
function on the grounds of uncertain evidence – i.e. on the grounds of a mere change of her 
credence in an evidential proposition that may not coincide with S’s coming to believe that 
proposition to the highest possible degree. Suppose Crold is S’s credence function before S’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This problem affects White’s objections independently of their synchronic or diachronic formulation. In White’s 
original synchronic formulation CrE(P), CrE(SH) and CrE(~SH) are replaced by the conditional credences Cr(P|E), 
Cr(SH|E) and Cr(~SH|E), which refer to the credence in P, SH and ~SH that I should rationally have if I believed E to 
the highest possible degree. Thus, again, P is replaced with E and an experience is replaced with a belief. 
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acquiring evidence y, and Crnew is S’s credence function upon her acquiring evidence y. Let x be any 
proposition on which Crold is defined. On Jeffrey conditionalisation, Crnew(x) = Crnew(y) Crold(x|y) + 
Crnew(~y) Crold(x|~y). This says that S’s credence in x upon S’s changing her credence in y is equal 
to the sum of two things: the product of S’s new credence in y by S’s conditional credence in x 
given y before S’s changing her credence in y, and the product of S’s new credence in ~y by S’s 
conditional credence in x given ~y before S’s changing her credence in y. Switching to Jeffrey 
conditionalisation would enable me to update my credence function on the basis of a mere increase 
in my credence in P (which wouldn’t coincide with my becoming certain that P). One might insist 
that a mere increase in my credence in P is a close surrogate for my experiencing as if P.  
However this suggestion is also doomed to fail, for the resulting re-formulations of White’s 
objections are inconclusive. These re-formulations would go through only if my acquiring uncertain 
evidence P should lessen (or at least should not boost) my credence in ~SH. But this turns out to be 
false. For on Jeffrey conditionalisation it holds true that if (i) Crnew(P) > Crold(P) and (ii) 
Crold(~SH|P) > Crold(~SH), then (iii) Crnew(~SH) > Crold(~SH). Since the suggestion we are 
inspecting here is to the effect that my credence in P raises, (i) is satisfied. Furthermore, P entails 
~SH and Crold(P) > 0, thus Crold(~SH|P) = 1. As I shouldn’t be certain that ~SH, Crold(~SH) < 1. 
Thus Crold(~SH|P) > Crold(~SH). So (ii) is satisfied too. Hence (iii) is true: my acquiring uncertain 
evidence P should boost my credence in ~SH. 
One might contend that White’s original objections hit dogmatism indirectly because, even 
though experiences are not beliefs about experiences, experiences and correlated introspective 
beliefs have the same evidential force. The contention would precisely be this: since my 
introspective belief that (E) I experience as if P lessens my justification for ~SH, my sole 
experience as if P should also lessen my justification for ~SH. White appears to endorse this view.20 
For instance, White (2006: 535) assumes that if I have the experience as if P together with the 
introspective belief that E, the strength of my justification for ~SH should be identical to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 And so does Silins (2007: 120, note 17). 
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strength of my justification for ~SH depending on my sole belief that E. This means that  – as we 
have seen – the strength of my justification for ~SH should decrease. (I agree with White on this 
point. I’ll return to it shortly.) White then suggests that: 
If the rational response to its appearing that [P] this is a hand, when I also believe that [E] it 
appears that this is a hand, is to decrease my confidence that [~SH] it is not a fake-hand,21 
then surely this is the rational response to the same experience [as if P] when I do not even 
consider how things appear to me. (2006: 535) 
 
Thus, for White, my experience as if P alone should lessen my justification for ~SH, exactly as my 
belief that E does. If White’s suggestion is correct, the dogmatist can be targeted by two informal 
objections that parallel White’s formal arguments. First, suppose my experience as if P raises my 
justification for P so that I have prima facie justification for believing P. As this experience doesn’t 
boost my justification for ~SH, my justification for P cannot transmit to ~SH. Second, since I know 
that P entails ~SH and justification is closed under known entailment, I can have prima facie 
justification for P when I experience as if P only if I have justification for ~SH. But my experience 
as if P can make me acquire no justification for ~SH. Thus I can have prima facie justification for 
believing P when I experience as if P only if I have independent justification for believing ~SH. 
One might find it intuitive that experiences and correlated introspective beliefs have the same or 
similar evidential force. However our intuitions about this matter seem to depend crucially on the 
conception of perceptual evidence we presuppose. If one adopts the dogmatist conception, one will 
naturally conclude that experiences and correlated introspective beliefs can have very dissimilar 
evidential force. Consider again E and P. Note that the content of the belief that E (the proposition 
that it appears to me that this is a hand) and the content of the experience as if P (the proposition 
that this is a hand) do not stand in the same logical relation with SH (the proposition that this is a 
fake-hand). Consequently, believing E and experiencing as if P will not have – presumably – the 
same evidential consequences for SH. As I know that SH entails E or makes E highly probable, it is 
intuitive that my learning E should boost my justification for SH and thus lessen my justification for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 White’s original passage omits ‘not’ and literally reads ‘it is a fake-hand’. This is certainly a typo. 
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~SH. On the other hand, as I know that P is logically incompatible with SH, it is very 
counterintuitive that my experience as if P – in which it seems to me to ascertain that P – should 
boost my justification for SH. The dogmatist is not committed to this odd claim. She will make the 
more plausible claim that, since I know P to be incompatible with SH, my experience as if P will 
lessen my justification for SH and thus boost my justification for ~SH. This claim doesn’t conflict 
with Bayesian principles because the evidence here is an experience and not a belief. Bayesianism 
has – so to speak – no jurisdiction over this epistemic transaction. If my experience as if P alone 
boosts my justification for ~SH, the informal objections to dogmatism don’t take off the ground. 
To complete my response to White’s arguments let me now focus on a last epistemological issue 
that will also prove relevant for the topic of the next section. The dogmatist can surely generalise 
the thesis that my experience as if P and my belief that E have divergent evidential force with 
respect to ~SH to other epistemic subjects and propositions. Consider any content of experience p 
(in Pryor’s sense) of any subject S capable of entertaining beliefs about her own experiences. The 
dogmatist can contend that the evidential force of S’s experience as if p with regard to a proposition 
x and the evidential force of S’s belief that (e) S experiences as if p with regard to the same 
proposition x need not coincide and may diverge. If this is true, an important question is how the 
evidential force of S’s experience as if p and the evidential force of S’s belief that e should work 
together to determine S’s justification for x. 
It appears intuitively true that when the strength of the justification that S’s belief that e supplies 
for a proposition x can be determined by S, the justification that S’s mere experience as if p supplies 
for x becomes irrelevant for S’s epistemic status with regard to x. We can express the same 
epistemological thesis by saying that the evidential import that S’s mere experience as if p has for x 
will be overruled by the evidential import that S’s belief that e has for x whenever the latter import 
can be determined by S. Note that when the evidential import that S’s experience as if p has for x is 
overruled by the evidential import that S’s belief that e has for x, the degree of S’s all things 
considered justification for x (i.e. the justification for x that S possesses when she has both the 
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experience as if p and the belief that e) will trivially coincide with the degree of S’s justification for 
x based on S’s belief that e.  
To sense the intuitive plausibility of the above epistemological considerations, let us consider 
this simple thought experiment. Suppose I face a randomly chosen wall in a square room. Since my 
eyes are shut, I cannot see the colour of the wall. I’m reliably told, however, that the room has two 
white walls and two red walls. One of the white walls is illuminated by a hidden red light, so that it 
would appear to me to be red, but the other three walls are illuminated by natural light. Let us 
stipulate that: 
R = ‘The wall is red’. 
B = ‘It appears to me that the wall is red’. 
SH* = ‘The wall is white but looks red because it is illuminated by a hidden red light’. 
It is easy to determine the strength of my prior justification for R, B and ~SH* (i.e. before I open 
my eyes). Given my background information, I should assume that Cr(R) = 1/2, Cr(B) ≅ 3/4 and 
Cr(~SH*) = 3/4. Since the threshold for justification for full belief is presumably very high and near 
to 1, I don’t have prior justification for fully believing R or ~SH*.  
Given my background information, it is also easy to determine the strength of the justification 
that I would have for R and ~SH* if I believed B. Since Cr(R) = 1/2, Cr(B) ≅ 3/4 and Cr(~SH*) = 
3/4, considering that Cr(B|R) ≅ 1 and Cr(B|~SH*) ≅ 2/3, it follows through Bayes theorem22 that 
Cr(R|B) ≅	  Cr(~SH*|B) ≅ 2/3. By conditionalising, CrB(R) ≅ CrB(~SH*) ≅ 2/3. Thus, even if I came to 
believe B, I would not have justification for fully believing R or ~SH*. Note that Cr(~SH*) = 3/4 > 
CrB(~SH*) ≅ 2/3. This indicates that if I believed B, my justification for ~SH* would actually drop, 
in accordance with White’s first objection. 
Now imagine I open my eyes and I experience as if R. Suppose I acquire prima facie immediate 
justification for fully believing R. Since my experience gives me the feeling of verifying just 
R, which is incompatible with SH*, I will lower my justification for SH* and thus boost my 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 According to which Cr(R|B) =	  Cr(R) Cr(B|R) / Cr(B) and Cr(~SH*|B) =	  Cr(~SH*) Cr(B|~SH*) / Cr(B).	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justification for ~SH*. In particular, since I have prima facie justification for fully believing R and I 
know that R entails ~SH*, I will acquire via transmission from R prima facie justification for fully 
believing ~SH* too. Yet suppose that after experiencing as if R, I reflect on my mental states and 
come to believe B. Since I can know the strength of the justification that this belief gives me for R 
and ~SH*, my experience as if R will cease to be evidentially relevant for R and ~SH*. And my all 
things considered justification for R and ~SH* will be determined by the above Bayesian 
inferences. Accordingly, I will not possess all things considered justification for fully believing R or 
~SH*. 
Let me outline another thought experiment that will hopefully persuade the reader still 
unconvinced that the evidential force of my experience as if R should be overruled by the evidential 
force of my belief that B if the latter force is determinable. Suppose an oracle, who I know to be 
virtually infallible, has just told me that I will have the experience as if R at t. Thus now I already 
believe B23 (suppose my confidence in B is as strong as if I were already at t and had that 
experience). Also imagine that now I have sufficient information to determine the justification that 
my believing B gives me for R and ~SH*. Suppose that then, at t, I experience as if R. It is strongly 
intuitive that my justification for R and ~SH* should not change at t. Since I can determine the 
strength of the justification that my belief that B gives me for R and ~SH*, this justification 
overrules the justification that my sole experiencing as if R gives me for R and ~SH*.  
As we saw in §4, White contends that his thought experiment about playing cards offers a clear 
example of the fact that my experiencing as if P (the proposition that this is a hand) lowers my 
justification for ~SH (the proposition that it is not the case that this is not a fake-hand). I’m now in 
the position to suggest a response to this contention on the dogmatist’s behalf.24 The dogmatist can 
argue as follows: White’s thought experiment shows at best that my experience as if P and my 
introspective belief (E) that I have that experience together lower my justification for ~SH. White’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  To prevent misunderstandings let’s make the implicit temporal references in B, R and ~SH* explicit. Thus B = ‘It 
appears to me at t that the wall is red at t’, R = ‘The wall is red at t’, and ~SH* = ‘At t the wall is white but looks red 
because it is illuminated by a hidden red light’.	  
24 White’s second, statistical example can be “defused” by the dogmatist in a similar way. 
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thought experiment does not show, however, that my sole experience as if P lowers (or even doesn’t 
change) my justification for ~SH. White’s thought experiment could in fact be described as 
proceeding along the following three contiguous stages: at t0, before lifting my arm, I don’t have 
justification for fully believing P or ~SH. At t1 I lift my arm and have the experience as if P. This 
experience makes me acquire prima facie justification for fully believing P and, via epistemic 
transmission, for fully believing ~SH. At t2 I reflect on my experience and come to believe E. My 
all things considered justification for ~SH comes now to coincide with the justification that my 
belief that E bestows on ~SH, which is lower than my prima facie justification for it at t2 and even 
than my initial justification for ~SH at t0. Thus the justification that decreases in White’s thought 
experiment is my all things considered justification for ~SH. But this doesn’t happen to my prima 
facie justification for ~SH, resting on my sole experience as if P, which instead increases. 
One might be puzzled by the claim that there are evidential transactions like those described by 
the dogmatist that, as I have argued in this section, are inexplicable in Bayesian terms. Why are 
there epistemic transactions of this sort if, as we have seen, the subject S should override their 
results as S reflects on her evidence and successfully applies Bayesian reasoning? The dogmatist 
can respond that we often attribute perceptually justified beliefs to beings incapable of reflecting on 
their experiences (such as small children and perhaps animals). If there existed no evidential 
transactions independent of introspective beliefs, we couldn’t easily make these attributions. The 
dogmatist could add that there may be cases in which even if S can reflect on her own perceptual 
evidence, S has insufficient background information to be able to draw Bayesian inferences. In 
these situations S cannot override the results of her non-Bayesian transactions, so S should stick to 
these results. (I return to this in the next section.) 
Let us consider our outcomes so far: we saw that White’s Bayesian arguments can directly hit 
neither the dogmatist’s thesis DG according to which my experiencing as if p can (and will often) 
give me prima facie justification for believing p that is not based on independent justification for 
~sh, nor the dogmatist’s thesis that this justification for p (if available) transmits to ~sh across the 
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entailment. We saw, furthermore, that White’s contention that the Bayesian arguments indirectly 
strike the above two theses can be rejected by the dogmatist without questioning Bayesian 
methodology. We can conclude that White has not shown that dogmatism and Bayesianism are 
incompatible. 
 
6. Does dogmatism have an antisceptical bite? 
Despite the above positive result, one could still argue that dogmatism doesn’t have the 
antisceptical punch that Pryor maintains it has. A simple argument for this conclusion is the 
following: consider any rational subject S capable like most of us of introspection, and any possible 
content p of S’s experience. The dogmatist can claim that S’s experience as if p can (and will often) 
give S immediate prima facie justification for believing p and, via transmission, prima facie 
justification for believing ~sh  (where sh is any non-perceiving alternative to p incompatible with 
p). The dogmatist should concede, however, that upon having the experience as if p, S should 
introspect herself and come to entertain the belief that (e) she has that experience. For this process 
would give S further evidence relevant for her appraisal of p and ~sh.25 Suppose then that S 
entertains the belief that e. As a consequence, the evidential force of S’s sole experience as if p for p 
and ~sh will be overruled by the evidential force of that introspective belief of S. Thus whether or 
not S has justification for believing p and ~sh will actually depend on the support that S’s belief that 
e supplies for p and ~sh, whereas the support that S’s experience as if p offers for p and ~sh will 
prove irrelevant for it. The result is that whether or not perceptual scepticism can be rebutted 
depends on whether or not the mediate justification produced by S’s introspective beliefs suffice to 
sustain S’s beliefs about her environment, but it clearly does not depend on any immediate 
justification that S’s experiences could produce. This shows that dogmatism has no real 
antisceptical punch for subjects like us capable of introspection. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Refraining from doing so would make S epistemically irresponsible.	  
	   23 
 Can the dogmatist resist this conclusion? I’m unable to settle this question here, as this would 
require a thorough investigation that I cannot carry out in the remainder of this paper. To contribute 
to the discussion on this issue I can only make two related suggestions. First, a rejoinder to the 
above argument seems to follow quite naturally from an assumption about the general setting of the 
debate on perceptual scepticism made by some advocates of dogmatism. Second, this assumption 
would prove false, and the rejoinder ineffective, if the controversial thesis that we can determine 
our prior credences in hypotheses and conjectures by inspecting their extra-empirical virtues turned 
out to be true. Thus whether or not dogmatism has an antisceptical bite seems to depend on the truth 
of this controversial thesis. 
 Let us start with my first suggestion. Pryor (manuscript) and Kung (2010) appear persuaded that: 
 
(U)  When we engage in discussion with the perceptual sceptic we should take the epistemic 
subject S to possess no default evidence for any non-perceiving alternative sh or its 
negation ~sh.26 
 
For example, Pryor (manuscript) states that the situations in which dogmatism is meant to apply to 
respond to the perceptual sceptic – so, presumably, the typical situations adduced by the perceptual 
sceptic – are those in which the epistemic subjects can conceive of some non-perceiving alternative 
sh ‘but are wholly uninformed about it’ (5, my emphasis). Kung (2010) describes the same 
situations as those in which ‘the subject has no [default] reason to believe any skeptical alternative 
[sh] to p’ (7), where ‘to have no reason to believe that sh … is to possess no considerations in favor 
of either sh or ~sh’27 (2, edited). 
 Unfortunately neither Pryor nor Kung has provided an explicit defence of U. Both of them 
concede that S could in principle acquire default evidence for sh or ~sh on the grounds of her 
knowledge of the chance or objective probability of sh (cf. Pryor, manuscript: §6 and Kung 2010: 
5-6). They seem to assume, however, that when perceptual scepticism is the object of discussion, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Weatherson (2007) might also accept U though I’m not completely sure.  27	  For	  Kung (2010) a reason for sh is ‘some cognitively accessible state that counts in favor of sh. It does not have to 
count very strongly in favor of sh; the reason may be far from strong enough to justify you in believing that sh’ (2, 
edited).	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we cannot take S to know the objective probabilities of sh. This assumption is very plausible if this 
knowledge is meant to come from perceptual evidence. Suppose we allowed S to know the 
objective probability of sh from, say, the relative frequency of the instantiations of the hypotheses 
of the same type as sh, where these instantiations are known by perception. Since the sceptic just 
claims that we cannot perceptually know anything, this would presumably beg the question against 
the sceptic. More generally, any explanation of S’s having default evidence for sh or ~sh resting on 
the presupposition that S has perceptual knowledge would be an easy target of the objection that it 
begs the question against the sceptic. 
 Let us suppose for the moment that U is correct. To defuse the argument against the antisceptical 
bite of dogmatism outlined at the beginning of this section, the dogmatist should infer from U – 
saying that S has no default evidence for sh or ~sh – that S has no way to set Cr(sh) and Cr(~sh), i.e. 
her prior credences in sh and ~sh. Bayesian objectivists and subjectivists28 are very likely to raise 
objections. The objectivist may contend that if S has no evidence for sh or ~sh, S is bound to 
determine Cr(sh) and Cr(~sh) by using some version of the principle of indifference.29 The 
subjectivist will contend, alternatively, that S is rationally entitled to set Cr(sh) and Cr(~sh) as she 
likes provided that these two values are probabilistically coherent (and perhaps satisfy some 
minimal formal constraint).30 The dogmatist can retort by questioning the adequacy of both 
objectivism and subjectivism when Bayesianism is specifically used to model – like in the present 
context – epistemic justification. The Bayesian formalism can model the notion of epistemic 
justification only if the rationality displayed by the credences referred to in its formulae is 
specifically epistemic (rather than, say, practical or moral). There is today wide agreement – at least 
among epistemologists sympathetic to internalism – that credences are epistemically rational only if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For these varieties see Weisberg (2011). 
29 A basic formulation of it says that given a countable set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses, if S’s 
evidence doesn’t favour some hypotheses over the others, S should distribute equally her credence over all of them. As 
sh and ~sh are mutually exclusive and exhaustive and S’s all evidence cannot discriminate between them, S’s credence 
in either hypothesis should be 1/2. Notoriously, the principle of indifference appears to entail incoherent results. White 
(2010) has attempted a defence of it. See however Dodd (2013)’s rejoinder.   
30 For instance some require Cr to be regular – i.e. to assign 0 and 1 only to respectively contradictions and tautologies.  
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they are suitably supported by evidence (cf. Kelly 2003). The dogmatist should insist that if S sets 
Cr(sh) and Cr(~sh) in accordance with objectivism or subjectivism in the envisaged situation of 
lack of evidence, S’s prior credences in sh and ~sh would fail to be epistemically rational. It would 
be implausible that Bayesian formulae could model S’s epistemic justification in that case.31  
 Once the Bayesian objectivist’s and the subjectivist’s objections have been set aside, the 
dogmatist can conclude that since Cr(~sh) cannot be determined, Cre(~sh) cannot be determined.32 
And that since Cre(~sh) cannot be determined and p entails ~sh so that Cre(p) ≤ Cre(~sh), Cre(p) 
cannot be determined either. Consequently, if upon experiencing as if p, S forms the introspective 
belief that e, this belief will have for S no determinable evidential consequences regarding p and 
~sh (at least via Bayesian reasoning). Hence S’s belief that e will have no determinable evidential 
consequences for p and ~sh capable of overruling the evidential consequences that S’s sole 
experience as if p has for p and ~sh. If this experience gives S prima facie justification for believing 
p33 and, via transmission, for believing ~sh, S should hold to this justification as all things 
considered justification. This seems to show that dogmatism has an antisceptical bite after all. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 One might perhaps think of other ways to determine Cr(sh) and Cr(~sh) in absence of evidence. Wright (2004 and 
2007) for instance contends that even though we have no default evidence for sh or ~sh, we are rationally entitled to 
accept or trust ~sh. It is unclear however if degrees of acceptance or trust qualify as degree of credence. Furthermore it 
is quite controversial whether the rationality of Wright’s entitlement is genuinely epistemic rather than only pragmatic 
(cf. Jenkins 2007 and Pritchard 2005).  
32 This is why: by definition of conditional credence Cr(~sh|e) = Cr(~sh & e)/Cr(e) with Cr(e) > 0. It follows from the 
probability calculus that Cr(~sh & e) ≤ Cr(~sh). As Cr(~sh) cannot be determined, Cr(~sh & e) cannot be determined. 
Thus Cr(~sh & e)/Cr(e) and Cr(~sh|e) cannot be determined. Since Cre(~sh) = Cr(~sh|e), Cre(~sh) cannot be determined 
either. The same result obtains if conditional credences are taken to be primitive. Suppose T is a tautology. It seems 
very plausible that if Cr(~sk) cannot be determined, then Cr(~sh|T) cannot be determined. Even if conditional credences 
are primitive, it holds true that Cr(~sh|e) = Cr(~sh|e & T) = Cr(~sh & e|T)/Cr(e|T) with Cr(e|T) > 0. Furthermore, Cr(~sh 
& e|T) ≤ Cr(~sh|T). Since Cr(~sh|T) cannot be determined, Cr(~sh & e|T) cannot be determined. So Cr(~sh & 
e|T)/Cr(e|T) cannot be determined, and neither Cr(~sh|e &T) nor Cr(~sh|e) can be determined. Thus, again, Cre(~sh) 
cannot be determined. Note that I’m presupposing that Cre(e) = 1; so I use standard conditionalisation. One might insist 
that Cre(e) should be < 1 and that, consequently, I should use Jeffrey conditionalisation. This would substantially 
change nothing. On Jeffrey conditionalisation Crnew(~sh) = Crnew(e) Crold(~sh|e) + Crnew(~e) Crold(~sh|~e). Since neither 
Crold(~sh|e) nor Crold(~sh|~e) can be determined, Crnew(~sh) cannot be determined. The reader can verify that nothing 
would substantially change if conditional credences were taken to be primitive. 33	  The sceptic might attempt to retort as follows: as S cannot determine Cr(p), S cannot determine her degree of default 
(or independent) justification for p, with the consequence that S’s experience as if p cannot give S immediate 
justification for believing p. But the chances of success of this retort look very dim. If there is anything like immediate 
perceptual justification for believing p, this justification is by definition not based on any degree of independent 
justification for any proposition, thus not even on any degree of independent justification for p itself. To make her point, 
the sceptic should argue that a condition necessary but not basing for S’s having immediate perceptual justification for 
believing p is S’s having some degree of independent justification for p. I don’t see how the sceptic could substantiate 
this claim. If immediate perceptual justification could be analysed in Bayesian terms, the sceptic might contend that a 
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 Let us turn to my second suggestion. Many epistemologists will probably find U moot or at least 
suspect. A reason to think so is the following: when we engage in discussion with the perceptual 
sceptic, it looks question begging to presuppose that we have default evidence for sh or ~sh rooted 
in perception. It doesn’t look question begging, however, to presuppose that we possess default 
evidence for sh or ~sh rooted in something other than perception. In particular, some philosophers 
contend that extra-empirical virtues of hypotheses and theories have evidential force. They 
typically concentrate on explanatory power, considered to be the most comprehensive and 
fundamental theoretical extra-empirical virtue (see mainly Lycan 2002). A few of these authors 
champion Bayesianism and suggest that if we have no other source of evidence, we can in principle 
determine our prior credence in any hypothesis by inspecting its explanatory power. The guiding 
intuition is that our subjective ascriptions of prior probabilities should mirror our assessments of 
explanatory power to the effect that hypotheses with higher explanatory power will get higher 
priors whereas hypotheses with lower explanatory power will get lower priors.34 Proposals of 
broadly this type have been put forward by, among others, Okasha (2000), McGrew (2003) and 
Lipton (2004). It is fair to say that both the thesis that explanatory power is a source of evidence 
and the thesis that evidence coming from explanatory power can be exploited to determine our prior 
credences are still hotly debated in the literature and appear quite controversial. (For an overview 
on the state of the discussion see Douven 2011.) Nonetheless, if these theses turned out to be true, U 
should be rejected. For we should take the epistemic subject S referred to in U to possess at least in 
principle extra-empirical evidence for determining Cr(sh)35 and thus Cr(~sh),36 for any non-
perceiving alternative sh conceivable by her. If this were the case, the argument against the thesis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
necessary condition for S’s determining Cre(p) is S’s being able to determine Cr(p) and insist that this condition is not 
basing. Yet, as I argued in the former section, it is very dubious that immediate perceptual justification can be analysed 
in Bayesian terms.	  34	  Although it is admittedly difficult to provide an analysis of the notion of explanatory power, it is uncontroversial that 
we can very often establish, on an intuitive basis, that a hypothesis does explain the evidence or that it explains it better 
or worse than other hypotheses.	  
35 In the same way we should take S to have evidence for determining the correlated Cr(p). 36	  Considering that Cr(~sh)	  =	  1 –	  Cr(sh).	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Dogmatism is an epistemological view worthy of attention and safeguarding: dogmatism makes 
sense of ordinary epistemic practices and attributions of perceptually warranted beliefs; it also 
seems to provide the basis for moderate foundationalism. In this paper I have argued that 
dogmatism is not incompatible with Bayesianism, as White contends. For dogmatism and 
Bayesianism are meant to account for different types of epistemic justification. Some 
epistemologists claim that dogmatism has an antisceptical punch. I have given non-conclusive 
reasons to doubt that this is true. I have suggested that the question of the antisceptical bite of 
dogmatism is entangled with the question of the evidential force of explanatory power, which is still 
hotly debated in current epistemology.  
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